UN PO' DI TEORIA ...OGNI TANTO CI VUOLE...
DA QUI NASCE L'ESIGENZA DI SPOSTARE IL PROPRIO CENTRO DI INTERESSI ECONOMICI IN SVIZZERA O IN ALTRI PAESI SANI.
nel frattempo la classe media HA LA POSSIBILITA' DI PROTEGGERSI DELOCALIZZANDO ED EFFETTUANDO INVESTIMENTI AL DI FUORI DEL DEBITO CHE NON VERRA' PIU' PAGATO, MA IN ASSETS REALI IN PAESI CON POCO DEBITO, O ACQUISTATI PER DUE SOLDI
QUINDI ANCHE IN QUEST'AUTUNNO...CHE LO SPREAD VADA A 300 E LA BORSA A 17.000 O 18.000 O CHE SALTI IL SISTEMA...LA COSA IMPORTANTE E' CHE I RISPARMI SIANO PROTETTI E DELOCALIZZATI.
Il che non vuol dire non partecipare a un eventuale ripresa temporanea dei prezzi di borsa ma da uno stato piu' sicuro..
leggi anche questi dati...:
Nessun bancario o promotore del trentino o del piemonte o un private banker ligure o milanese potrà mai dirvi e raccontarvi queste cose!!!! LUI E' LEGATO AL SUO MONDO E AL SUO STIPENDIO...PERDEREBBE IL LAVORO E COSA DIREBBE QUANDO A CASA SI TROVASSE DAVANTI GLI OCCHI TRISTI DI SUO FIGLIO!!!
per questo motivo ML sta organizzando incontri fra bancari e strutture svizzere per dare la possibilità ad alcuni soggetti che capiscono la crisi di poter proteggere il proprio futuro economico e quello dei propri clienti. (se sei interessato manda una mail a mercatiliberi@gmail.com)
e non pensare che siamo dei pazzi catastrofisti...i dati della spagna o della grecia o dell'italia relativamente allo spostamento dei capitali è impressionante...
Fuga di capitali dalla Spagna
Bilancia finanziaria in negativo per 220 miliardi di euro nel primo semestre
MADRID - Prosegue la fuga di capitali dalla Spagna: nel primo semestre dell'anno è stata di 219,817 miliardi di euro, dei quali 56,631 nel solo mese di giugno, corrispondenti a prestiti, depositi e investitori nazionali ed internazionali. Sono i dati diffusi oggi dalla Banca di Spagna.
Nello stesso periodo del 2011 il saldo della bilancia finanziaria era positivo e registrava entrate nette di capitali di 22,457 miliardi di euro.
MADRID - Prosegue la fuga di capitali dalla Spagna: nel primo semestre dell'anno è stata di 219,817 miliardi di euro, dei quali 56,631 nel solo mese di giugno, corrispondenti a prestiti, depositi e investitori nazionali ed internazionali. Sono i dati diffusi oggi dalla Banca di Spagna.
Nello stesso periodo del 2011 il saldo della bilancia finanziaria era positivo e registrava entrate nette di capitali di 22,457 miliardi di euro.
Nello stesso periodo del 2011 il saldo della bilancia finanziaria era positivo e registrava entrate nette di capitali di 22,457 miliardi di euro.
"Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended Consequences"
William R. White is currently the chairman of the Economic Development and Review Committee at the OECD in Paris. He was previously Economic Advisor and Head of the Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. He is clearly no economic lightweight, nor is he an ideologue. When he writes, attention must be paid. (http://williamwhite.ca/
And he has written a rather pointed indictment of Federal Reserve monetary policy, which has been published on the Dallas Federal Reserve website: http://dallasfed.org/assets/
Basically, he looks at the unintended consequences of quantitative easing and concludes that there are limits to what central banks can do, and negative consequences if policies are too easy for too long. He notes later in the essay that:
"Stimulative monetary policies are commonly referred to as 'Keynesian'. However, it is important to note that Keynes himself was not convinced of the effectiveness of easy money in restoring real growth in the face of a Deep Slump. This is one of the principal insights of the General Theory."
I am going to quote him at length in the next few pages. I hope that it intrigues you enough that you will want to go and read the paper yourself. This is not just dry theory. If QE is maintained for too long, then those of us in the "cheap seats" will have to deal with the consequences. Let me note that there are some 126 footnotes. I would recommend at least keeping up with them, as I found the "extra" commentary to often be very enlightening. This is a well-written paper that avoids the all-too-typical verbal garbage that passes for economics writing these days.
Let's start with his introduction:
"The central banks of the advanced market economies (AME's) have embarked upon one of the greatest economic experiments of all time – ultra easy monetary policy. In the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis which began in the summer of 2007, they lowered policy rates effectively to the zero lower bound (ZLB). In addition, they took various actions which not only caused their balance sheets to swell enormously, but also increased the riskiness of the assets they chose to purchase. Their actions also had the effect of putting downward pressure on their exchange rates against the currencies of Emerging Market Economies (EME's). Since virtually all EME's tended to resist this pressure, their foreign exchange reserves rose to record levels, helping to lower long term rates in AME's as well. Moreover, domestic monetary conditions in the EMEs were eased as well. The size and global scope of these discretionary policies makes them historica lly unprecedented. Even during the Great Depression of the 1930's, policy rates and longer term rates in the most affected countries (like the US) were never reduced to such low levels.
"In the immediate aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the exceptional measures introduced by the central banks of major AME's were rightly and successfully directed to restoring financial stability. Interbank markets in particular had dried up, and there were serious concerns about a financial implosion that could have had important implications for the real economy. Subsequently, however, as the financial system seemed to stabilize, the justification for central bank easing became more firmly rooted in the belief that such policies were required to restore aggregate demand6 after the sharp economic downturn of 2009. In part, this was a response to the prevailing orthodoxy that monetary policy in the 1930's had not been easy enough and that this error had contributed materially to the severity of the Great Depression in the United States.7
"However, it was also due to the growing reluctance to use more fiscal stimulus to support demand, given growing market concerns about the extent to which sovereign debt had built up during the economic downturn. The fact that monetary policy was increasingly seen as the 'only game in town' implied that central banks in some AME's intensified their easing even as the economic recovery seemed to strengthen through 2010 and early 2011. Subsequent fears about a further economic downturn, reopening the issue of potential financial instability, gave further impetus to 'ultra easy monetary policy'.
"From a Keynesian perspective, based essentially on a one period model of the determinants of aggregate demand, it seemed clearly appropriate to try to support the level of spending. After the recession of 2009, the economies of the AME's seemed to be operating well below potential, and inflationary pressures remained subdued. Indeed, various authors used plausible versions of the Taylor rule to assert that the real policy rate required to reestablish a full employment equilibrium (and prevent deflation) was significantly negative. Such findings were used to justify the use of non standard monetary measures when nominal policy rates hit the ZLB.
"There is, however, an alternative perspective that focuses on how such policies can also lead to unintended consequences over longer time periods. This strand of thought also goes back to the pre War period, when many business cycle theorists focused on the cumulative effects of bank†created†credit on the supply side of the economy. In particular, the Austrian school of thought, spearheaded by von Mises and Hayek, warned that credit driven expansions would eventually lead to a costly misallocation of real resources ('malinvestments') that would end in crisis. Based on his experience during the Japanese crisis of the 1990's, Koo (2003) pointed out that an overhang of corporate investment and corporate debt could also lead to the same result (a 'balance sheet recession').
"Researchers at the Bank for International Settlements have suggested that a much broader spectrum of credit driven 'imbalances', financial as well as real, could potentially lead to boom†bust processes that might threaten both price stability and financial stability. This BIS way of thinking about economic and financial crises, treating them as systemic breakdowns that could be triggered anywhere in an overstretched system, also has much in common with insights provided by interdisciplinary work on complex adaptive systems. This work indicates that such systems, built up as a result of cumulative processes, can have highly unpredictable dynamics and can demonstrate significant non linearities. The insights of George Soros, reflecting decades of active market participation, are of a similar nature."
And then White anticipates his conclusion:
"One reason for believing this is that monetary stimulus, operating through traditional ('flow') channels, might now be less effective in stimulating aggregate demand than previously. Further, cumulative ('stock') effects provide negative feedback mechanisms that over time also weaken both supply and demand. It is also the case that ultra easy monetary policies can eventually threaten the health of financial institutions and the functioning of financial markets, threaten the 'independence' of central banks, and can encourage imprudent behavior on the part of governments. None of these unintended consequences is desirable. Since monetary policy is not 'a free lunch', governments must therefore use much more vigorously the policy levers they still control to support strong, sustainable and balanced growth at the global level."
White anticipates the objection that ultra-easy monetary policies clearly had a positive effect early on.
"The force of these arguments might seem to lead to the conclusion that continuing with ultra easy monetary policy is a thoroughly bad idea. However, an effective counter argument is that such policies avert near term economic disaster and, in effect, 'buy time' to pursue other policies that could have more desirable outcomes. Among these policies might be suggested more international policy coordination and higher fixed investment (both public and private) in AME's. These policies would contribute to stronger aggregate demand at the global level. This would please Keynes. As well, explicit debt reduction, accompanied by structural reforms to redress other 'imbalances' and increase potential growth, would make remaining debts more easily serviceable. This would please Hayek. Indeed, it could be suggested that a combination of all these policies must be vigorously pursued if we are to have any hope of achieving the 'strong, sustained and ba lanced growth' desired by the G 20. We do not live in an 'either†or' world.
"The danger remains, of course, that ultra easy monetary policy will be wrongly judged as being sufficient to achieve these ends. In that case, the 'bought time' would in fact have been wasted. In this case, the arguments presented in this paper then logically imply that monetary policy should be tightened, regardless of the current state of the economy, because the near term expected benefits of ultra easy monetary policies are outweighed by the longer term expected costs. Undoubtedly this would be very painful, but (by definition) less painful than the alternative of not doing so. John Kenneth Galbraith touched upon a similar practical conundrum some years ago when he said
"'Politics is not the art of the possible. It is choosing between the unpalatable and the disastrous'.
"This might well be where the central banks of the AME's [advanced-market economies] are now headed, absent the vigorous pursuit by governments of the alternative policies suggested above."
White then launches into a long litany of unintended and undesirable consequences of maintaining an easy monetary policy too long, some of which we can clearly see developing now. He particularly notes problems with the shadow banking system and the effects of low interest rates on insurance companies (and, I would add, pensions!).
"What are the implications of ultra easy monetary policy for governments? One technical response is that it could influence the maturity structure of government debt. With a positively sloped yield curve, governments might be tempted to rely on ever shorter financing. This would leave them open to significant refinancing risks when interest rates eventually began to rise. Indeed, if the maturity structure became short enough, higher rates to fight inflationary pressure might cause a widening of the government deficit sufficient to raise fears of fiscal dominance. In the limit, monetary tightening might then raise inflationary expectations rather than lower them."
"A more fundamental effect on governments, however, is that it fosters false confidence in the sustainability of their fiscal position… Koo, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, and others are undoubtedly right in suggesting that a debt driven private sector collapse should normally be offset by public sector stimulus. What cannot be forgotten, however, is the suddenness with which market confidence can be lost, and the fact that the Japanese situation is highly unusual in a number of ways."
If interest rates were to rise in the US to more normal levels, the deficit would explode under current spending and tax policies, destroying whatever policy solutions are reached next year.
There is no easy way to exit from current policies, and the longer one waits the more difficult it will get. This is true in the US, Europe, and Japan. It is part and parcel of the Endgame. And this is the defining challenge of our time, and especially in the US as we approach the coming election
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2 commenti:
Te l'ho già scritto.
Leggere White spesso sembra di leggere Carbone.
In effetti parte da Mises subito dall'inizio.
Non c'è altra via: "End of the road"
http://100thmonkeyfilms.com/endoftheroad/
Comprati il film.
Il Folletto
E’ ripresa la fuga di capitali verso il Canton Ticino. Ma stavolta legale!!!
http://www.lindipendenza.com/e-ripresa-la-fuga-di-capitali-verso-il-canton-ticino-ma-stavolta-legale/
Luciano
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