MERCATO LIBERO

I MERCATI AZIONARI SONO PRONTI AL RIALZO?

NON E' DETTO CHE NON SI FACCIA UN ALTRO GIRO IN GIU'...LE BANCHE EUROPEE COME ANDRANNO? L'ARTICOLO CHE SEGUE E' MOLTO INTERESSANTE E METTE IL PUNTO DI DOMANDA AL RIALZO DI IERI.

E' OVVIO CHE LA SOLUZIONE PER L'EUROPA SI CHIAMA:
EUROBOND E INTERVENTI PESANTI IN AIUTO DA CINA E ALTRI PAESI NEL MONDO....
OVVERO L'ENNESIMA DROGA CHE POTREBBE SVEGLIARE PER QUALCHE MESE I FINANZIARI DAL LETARGO....

FINO A CHE NON SARA' CHIARITO IL TUTTO....LE BANCHE SONO TITOLI AD ALTO RISCHIO SPECULATIVO!


Questo articolo DEL PREMIO NOBEL KRUGMAN farà il giro del mondo....

MERITA UNA LETTURA ATTENTA, PURTROPPO L'ARTICOLO E' MOLTO LUNGO E TRADURLO DIVENTA ARDUO.

L'EUROPA PUO' ESSERE SALVATA

MI LIMITO A UN RIASSUNTO DELLE PARTI CHE PIU' POSSONO INTERESSARE GLI INVESTITORI:





FOUR EUROPEAN PLOTLINES (4 POSSIBILI SOLUZIONI PER L'EUROPA)


Some economists, myself included, look at Europe’s woes and have the feeling that we’ve seen this movie before, a decade ago on another continent — specifically, in Argentina.

KRUGMAN SI CHIEDE SE QUESTO E' UN FILM GIA' VISTO (ARGENTINA) (pensate alla delocalizzazione dei risparmi...oro, brasile, svizzera...)

KRUGMAN SPIEGA COSA E' AVVENUTO IN ARGENTINA E PARAGONA LA SITUAZIONE EUROPEA DI GRECIA E IRLANDA IN MANIERA ESAUSIVA E CHIARA


Unlike Spain or Greece, Argentina never gave up its own currency, but in 1991 it did the next best thing: it rigidly pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar, establishing a “currency board” in which each peso in circulation was backed by a dollar in reserves. This was supposed to prevent any return to Argentina’s old habit of covering its deficits by printing money. And for much of the 1990s, Argentina was rewarded with much lower interest rates and large inflows of foreign capital.

Eventually, however, Argentina slid into a persistent recession and lost investor confidence. Argentina’s government tried to restore that confidence through rigorous fiscal orthodoxy, slashing spending and raising taxes. To buy time for austerity to have a positive effect, Argentina sought and received large loans from the International Monetary Fund — in much the same way that Greece and Ireland have sought emergency loans from their neighbors. But the persistent decline of the Argentine economy, combined with deflation, frustrated the government’s efforts, even as high unemployment led to growing unrest.

By early 2002, after angry demonstrations and a run on the banks, it had all fallen apart. The link between the peso and the dollar collapsed, with the peso plunging; meanwhile, Argentina defaulted on its debts, eventually paying only about 35 cents on the dollar.

LA SVALUTAZIONE DELLA VALUTA LOCALE FU DRAMMATICA - (60%)

It’s hard to avoid the suspicion that something similar may be in the cards for one or more of Europe’s problem economies. After all, the policies now being undertaken by the crisis countries are, qualitatively at least, very similar to those Argentina tried in its desperate effort to save the peso-dollar link: harsh fiscal austerity in an effort to regain the market’s confidence, backed in Greece and Ireland by official loans intended to buy time until private lenders regain confidence. And if an Argentine-style outcome is the end of the line, it will be a terrible blow to the euro project. Is that what’s going to happen?

KRUGMAN ORA SPIEGA CHE E' POSSIBILE CHE PER ALCUNI PAESI DELL'EUROPA L'ARGENTINA POSSA ESSERE EVITATA.

Not necessarily. As I see it, there are four ways the European crisis could play out (and it may play out differently in different countries). Call them toughing it out; debt restructuring; full Argentina; and revived Europeanism.

CI SONO 4 SOLUZIONI

Toughing it out: Troubled European economies could, conceivably, reassure creditors by showing sufficient willingness to endure pain and thereby avoid either default or devaluation. The role models here are the Baltic nations: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. These countries are small and poor by European standards; they want very badly to gain the long-term advantages they believe will accrue from joining the euro and becoming part of a greater Europe. And so they have been willing to endure very harsh fiscal austerity while wages gradually come down in the hope of restoring competitiveness — a process known in Eurospeak as “internal devaluation.”

1) AUSTERITA' FISCALE - INTERNAL DEVALUATION: QUESTA E' LA SOLUZIONE SCELTA DAI PAESI BALTICI MA IL COSTO E' STATO ALTISSIMO. LA DEPRESSIONE E' STATA VIOLENTISSIMA, PER IL RECUPERO POTREBBERO VOLERCI TANTISSIMI ANNI - DA TACITO: HANNO CREATO UN DESERTO E LO CHIAMANO PACE....

Have these policies been successful? It depends on how you define “success.” The Baltic nations have, to some extent, succeeded in reassuring markets, which now consider them less risky than Ireland, let alone Greece. Meanwhile, wages have come down, declining 15 percent in Latvia and more than 10 percent in Lithuania and Estonia. All of this has, however, come at immense cost: the Baltics have experienced Depression-level declines in output and employment. It’s true that they’re now growing again, but all indications are that it will be many years before they make up the lost ground.

It says something about the current state of Europe that many officials regard the Baltics as a success story. I find myself quoting Tacitus: “They make a desert and call it peace” — or, in this case, adjustment. Still, this is one way the euro zone could survive intact.

2) RISTRUTTURAZIONE DEI DEBITI. I TITOLI DEL PORTOGALLO E DELLA GRECIA HANNO DELLE QUOTAZIONI CHE RIFLETTONO LA CONSAPEVOLEZZA DEGLI INVESTITORI CHE IL DEBITO NON VERRA' ONORATO E CHE VERRA' PROPOSTA UNA RINEGOZIAZIONE.
I POSSESSORI DI OBBLIGAZIONI IRLANDESI POTREBBERO ESSERE OBBLIGATI AD ACCETTARE IL 40% DEL VALORE NOMINALE (pensate alle conseguenze per i BTP italiani, il cui debito è piu' alto di quello Irlandese)...
MA QUESTO PROCESSO PORTEREBBE A OBBLIGARE I GRECI E IRLANDESI A UN PAREGGIO DI BILANCIO E I TASSI D'INTERESSE POTREBBERO SALIRE ALLE STELLE.

KRUGMAN SI DOMANDA SE QUESTA RISTRUTTURAZIONE POTRA' COLPIRE ANCHE L'ITALIA..... E POI NON DIMENTICATEVI DELLA DELOCALIZZAZIONE


Debt restructuring: At the time of writing, Irish 10-year bonds were yielding about 9 percent, while Greek 10-years were yielding 12½ percent. At the same time, German 10-years — which, like Irish and Greek bonds, are denominated in euros — were yielding less than 3 percent. The message from the markets was clear: investors don’t expect Greece and Ireland to pay their debts in full. They are, in other words, expecting some kind of debt restructuring, like the restructuring that reduced Argentina’s debt by two-thirds.

Such a debt restructuring would by no means end a troubled economy’s pain. Take Greece: even if the government were to repudiate all its debt, it would still have to slash spending and raise taxes to balance its budget, and it would still have to suffer the pain of deflation. But a debt restructuring could bring the vicious circle of falling confidence and rising interest costs to an end, potentially making internal devaluation a workable if brutal strategy.

Frankly, I find it hard to see how Greece can avoid a debt restructuring, and Ireland isn’t much better. The real question is whether such restructurings will spread to Spain and — the truly frightening prospect — to Belgium and Italy, which are heavily indebted but have so far managed to avoid a serious crisis of confidence.

3) USCITA DALL'EURO.

IN EUROPA E' GIA' SUCCESSO NELLA PICCOLA ISLANDA, LA CUI VALUTA HA PERSO IN POCHE SETTIMANE IL 50% DEL SUO VALORE...

MA L'ISLANDA AVEVA LA SUA VALUTA E TUTTO E' STATO PIU' SEMPLICE. IL PROBLEMA E' CHE I SINGOLI PAESI IN EUROPA NON HANNO PIU' LA LORO VALUTA. MA SE LA FIDUCIA COMINCIA A MANCARE E LE PERSONE DOVESSERO SPOSTARE I RISPARMI (DELOCALIZZAZIONE)O VENDERE EURO PER COMPRARE ALTRE VALUTE (DIVERSIFICAZIONE) IN MASSA...ALLORA IL PEGGIO POTREBBE CAPITARE E L'ARGENTINA DIVENTARE REALTA'

(IN QUESTO PEZZO IL NOBEL KRUGMAN DA ASSOLUTAMENTE RAGIONE AL PENSIERO DI MERCATO LIBERO)


Full Argentina: Argentina didn’t simply default on its foreign debt; it also abandoned its link to the dollar, allowing the peso’s value to fall by more than two-thirds. And this devaluation worked: from 2003 onward, Argentina experienced a rapid export-led economic rebound.

The European country that has come closest to doing an Argentina is Iceland, whose bankers had run up foreign debts that were many times its national income. Unlike Ireland, which tried to salvage its banks by guaranteeing their debts, the Icelandic government forced its banks’ foreign creditors to take losses, thereby limiting its debt burden. And by letting its banks default, the country took a lot of foreign debt off its national books.

At the same time, Iceland took advantage of the fact that it had not joined the euro and still had its own currency. It soon became more competitive by letting its currency drop sharply against other currencies, including the euro. Iceland’s wages and prices quickly fell about 40 percent relative to those of its trading partners, sparking a rise in exports and fall in imports that helped offset the blow from the banking collapse.

The combination of default and devaluation has helped Iceland limit the damage from its banking disaster. In fact, in terms of employment and output, Iceland has done somewhat better than Ireland and much better than the Baltic nations.

So will one or more troubled European nations go down the same path? To do so, they would have to overcome a big obstacle: the fact that, unlike Iceland, they no longer have their own currencies. As Barry Eichengreen of Berkeley pointed out in an influential 2007 analysis, any euro-zone country that even hinted at leaving the currency would trigger a devastating run on its banks, as depositors rushed to move their funds to safer locales. And Eichengreen concluded that this “procedural” obstacle to exit made the euro irreversible.

But Argentina’s peg to the dollar was also supposed to be irreversible, and for much the same reason. What made devaluation possible, in the end, was the fact that there was a run on the banks despite the government’s insistence that one peso would always be worth one dollar. This run forced the Argentine government to limit withdrawals, and once these limits were in place, it was possible to change the peso’s value without setting off a second run. Nothing like that has happened in Europe — yet. But it’s certainly within the realm of possibility, especially as the pain of austerity and internal devaluation drags on.

4) RINASCITA DEL SENTIMENTO EUROPEO
I PRIMI TRE SCENARI SONO MOLTO CUPI. NE ESISTE UNO MENO PESSIMISTICO?

SI, SONO GLI EUROBONDS CHE TREMONTI E JUNKER HANNO CHIESTO ALL'EUROPA A DICEMBRE E CHE MERCATO LIBERO CHIEDE DA CIRCA 1 ANNO.

IN QUESTO CASO L'EUROPA FINIREBBE PER COPIARE GLI STATI UNITI. MA PER ORA LA MERKEL E' SORDA E QUESTA SOLUZIONE NON SEMBRA LA PREFERITA.

Revived Europeanism: The preceding three scenarios were grim. Is there any hope of an outcome less grim? To the extent that there is, it would have to involve taking further major steps toward that “European federation” Robert Schuman wanted 60 years ago.

In early December, Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of Luxembourg, and Giulio Tremonti, Italy’s finance minister, created a storm with a proposal to create “E-bonds,” which would be issued by a European debt agency at the behest of individual European countries. Since these bonds would be guaranteed by the European Union as a whole, they would offer a way for troubled economies to avoid vicious circles of falling confidence and rising borrowing costs. On the other hand, they would potentially put governments on the hook for one another’s debts — a point that furious German officials were quick to make. The Germans are adamant that Europe must not become a “transfer union,” in which stronger governments and nations routinely provide aid to weaker.

Yet as the earlier Ireland-Nevada comparison shows, the United States works as a currency union in large part precisely because it is also a transfer union, in which states that haven’t gone bust support those that have. And it’s hard to see how the euro can work unless Europe finds a way to accomplish something similar.

Nobody is yet proposing that Europe move to anything resembling U.S. fiscal integration; the Juncker-Tremonti plan would be at best a small step in that direction. But Europe doesn’t seem ready to take even that modest step.


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E QUINDI???

ALLO STATO ATTUALE LA PRIMA SOLUZIONE SEMBRA QUELLA SCELTA DALL'EUROPA DELLA MERKEL.



OUT OF MANY, ONE?
For now, the plan in Europe is to have everyone tough it out — in effect, for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain to emulate Latvia and Estonia. That was the clear verdict of the most recent meeting of the European Council, at which Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, essentially got everything she wanted. Governments that can’t borrow on the private market will receive loans from the rest of Europe — but only on stiff terms: people talk about Ireland getting a “bailout,” but it has to pay almost 6 percent interest on that emergency loan. There will be no E-bonds; there will be no transfer union.

Even if this eventually works in the sense that internal devaluation has worked in the Baltics — that is, in the narrow sense that Europe’s troubled economies avoid default and devaluation — it will be an ugly process, leaving much of Europe deeply depressed for years to come. There will be political repercussions too, as the European public sees the continent’s institutions as being — depending on where they sit — either in the business of bailing out deadbeats or acting as agents of heartless bill collectors.

Nor can the rest of the world look on smugly at Europe’s woes. Taken as a whole, the European Union, not the United States, is the world’s largest economy; the European Union is fully coequal with America in the running of the global trading system; Europe is the world’s most important source of foreign aid; and Europe is, whatever some Americans may think, a crucial partner in the fight against terrorism. A troubled Europe is bad for everyone else.

In any case, the odds are that the current tough-it-out strategy won’t work even in the narrow sense of avoiding default and devaluation — and the fact that it won’t work will become obvious sooner rather than later. At that point, Europe’s stronger nations will have to make a choice.

IN OGNI CASO LE PROBABILITA' CHE QUESTA STRATEGIA FUNZIONI SONO RIDOTTE AL LUMICINO.
E A UN CERTO PUNTO LA GERMANIA E FORSE LA FRANCIA DOVRANNO DECIDERE SUL DA FARSI...


It has been 60 years since the Schuman declaration started Europe on the road to greater unity. Until now the journey along that road, however slow, has always been in the right direction. But that will no longer be true if the euro project fails. A failed euro wouldn’t send Europe back to the days of minefields and barbed wire — but it would represent a possibly irreversible blow to hopes of true European federation.

E KRUGMAN, NON DA UNA RISPOSTA ...PERCHE' QUI SI PARLA DI POLITICA E NON DI ECONOMIA

So will Europe’s strong nations let that happen? Or will they accept the responsibility, and possibly the cost, of being their neighbors’ keepers? The whole world is waiting for the answer.




DOPO QUESTO ARTICOLO, ANCHE UN BAMBINO CAPISCE CHE E' DA SPROVVEDUTI TENERE TUTTI I RISPARMI IN UN PAESE COME L'ITALIA PENSANDO CHE SIA IMPOSSIBILE AVERE DEI PROBLEMI E CHE NON CI SIANO RISCHI.

E' ASSURDO, INCONCEPIBILE E IRRAZIONALE!

oro fisico, brasile, svizzera, diversificazione valutaria , centrale fotovoltaica ecc ecc MERCATO LIBERO IN QUESTI ANNI HA DIMOSTRATO DI FARE TANTE COSE CON UN'ESTREMA ATTENZIONE E PORTANDO A TERMINE I PROGETTI LANCIATI.

NON PERDERE TEMPO...PROTEGGI I TUOI RISPARMI
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ARTICOLO IMPORTANTE: GOD SAVE EUROPE!!! BY MR NOBEL KRUGMAN