STABLE COIN LA VIA PER ESSERE LIBERI DAL FALLIMENTO DEL SISTEMA EURO


TREMONTI BONDS...ECCO PERCHE' IL CAVALIERE FA PACE CON I BANCHIERI - A VILLA MADAMA LA FESTA DELLA CASTA - IL POPOLO RINGRAZIA


Come sapete i bilanci del 2008 delle banche italiane NON creeranno delle perdite ...

OCCHIO CARI REVISORI DI BILANCIO CHE POTREBBERO FARVI CAUSA SE NON FATE IL VOSTRO LAVORO IN MODO CORRETTO.

Infatti i nostri banchieri hanno deciso di non procedere alle corrette svalutazioni degli attivi di bilancio. ATTENZIONE A BILANCI CHE POTREBBERO RISULTARE FUORVIANTI E UN DOMANI CONSIDERATI FALSI!!!

Ecco che i TREMONTI BONDS...APPARENTEMENTE CARI....rappresentano per le banche una grandissima occasione per prendere i soldi dei cittadini italianio a costo ZERO!!

Infatti TALI OBBLIGAZIONI (SI LEGGE NELLE GAZZETTA UFFICIALE) sono subordinate. Ovvero NON danno diritto alla cedola se il bilancio della banca NON è in utile.
Inoltre le cedole perse in un anno NON sono recuperabili nell'anno successivo.

QUI DI SEGUITO VI DICO QUELLO CHE ACCADRA'.....

1) IL BILANCIO 2009 E 2010 DELLE BANCHE ITALIANE CHE RICORRERANNO ALLE OBBLIGAZIONI DI TREMONTI CHIUDERANNO IN ROSSO GRAZIE A SVALUTAZIONI CHE INVECE DOVREBBERO COMPETERE AL 2008.

2)LE BANCHE QUINDI NON PAGHERANNO INTERESSI AL GOVERNO PER I PROSSIMI DUE ANNI. Ovvero i soldi dei cittadini verranno usati per salvare le banche senza remunerazione alcuna. Un costo insopportabile per il cittadino. Fra l'altro i managers e i potentati bancari rimarranno saldamente al potere.

3) Se in futuro le banche cominceranno a fare profitti, saremo in uin contesto iperinflattivo, con tassi d'interesse abbondantemente più alti che il 7,5% che dovranno pagare al governo.

MORALE:
A) IL CITTADINO ITALIANO LA PRENDERA' IN QUEL POSTO SEMPRE
B) IL GOVERNO SI SARA' TENUTO BUONI I BANCHIERI
C) I BANCHIERI SARANNO SEMPRE LI' CON STIPENDI DA FAVOLA A ORGANIZZARE ALTRE NEFANDEZZE.


TROVO ALTAMENTE IMMORALE IL COMPORTAMENTO DELLA CLASSE POLITICA DI DESTRA E SINISTRA, PER NON PARLARE DI TUTTE LE BANCHE CHE NON FARANNO PULIZIA DI BILANCIO NEL CORSO DEL 2008 E CHE CHIEDERANNO I TREMONTI BONDS.

TREMONTI, DOPO LA ROBIN TAX E LA TASSA ALL'ENI...STA COMBINANDO L'ENNESIMO MADORNALE ERRORE DI POLITICA ECONOMICA....
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10 commenti:

Anonimo ha detto...

Analisi impeccabile!

Complimenti.

Anonimo ha detto...

E questo sarebbe il ministro delle finanze prodigio, quello che si vuol far passare come uno dei pochi consapevoli della tragica situazione finanziaria in cui ci troviamo? Ma per favore...

Anonimo ha detto...

Infatti mi pareva un pò eccessiva la foga per i T-Bond (da non confondere coi Treasury-Bond) al 7-8% quando sul mercato una obbligazione corporate rende il 4 se va bene.
Ecco che salta fuori l'arcano...
Niente utili, via un po' di polvere da sotto il tappeto e finanziamenti a tasso 0.
A questo punto le obbligazioni bancarie ordinarie a tasso variabile diventano un hold/buy, comunque meglio di un BOT/CCT,
o sbaglio?
Saluti.
RedLizard

Anonimo ha detto...

Gent. Dott. Barrai, lei è un galantuomo.
In questa porca Italia di inizio millennio quella dei galantuomini è una razza ormai estinta tra chiunque abbia un ruolo di qualche rilevanza pubblica.
Sono disperato perchè ho una figlia piccola, ma sono troppo in la con gli anni per andarmene oltre le Alpi.

Anonimo ha detto...

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=55371903405

Aderite all'iniziativa

Invito al Governo per l'abolizione dell'imposta di bollo sul c/c bancario.

Paolo

ML ha detto...

vedete voi se è vecchia....


Moody's downgrades RBS non-cumulative preference shares from A2/A3 to Ba1/Ba2
1517 parole
11 marzo 2009
Moody's Investors Service Press Release
Inglese
(c) 2009
Moody's Investors Service today downgraded the following non-cumulative preference shares issued by Royal Bank of Scotland Group ("RBSG"):
- Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc non-cumulative preference shares from A3 to Ba2
- RBS Capital Trust non-cumulative trust preferred securities from A3 to Ba2
- National Westminster Bank plc 9% non-cumulative preference shares from A2 to Ba1
The outlook for all the instruments remains negative, in line with the negative outlook on the A1 and Aa3 senior debt rating of RBSG and National Westminster Bank plc.
This rating action completes the review of the bank's non-cumulative preference shares initiated on January 20, 2009, where we indicated that instruments which gain voting rights in certain circumstances would be likely to drop to non-investment grade. The downgrades reflect the fact that whereas the nationalisation of these instruments is not our central scenario, the potential loss to investors in such a situation would be very high. Furthermore, we also are concerned that the possibility of a distressed exchange - whereby the bank would stop making coupon payments and offer to exchange these instruments into equity so that hybrid investors would share the risk of recapitalizing the bank with taxpayers - is an additional risk factor, especially for non-cumulative instruments.
Moody's considers that the announcement by RBS of its participation in the UK Government's Asset Protection Scheme on 26th February and the issuance of B-shares to the government, confirms our core assumption that the UK government aims to avoid full nationalisation of RBS. In addition, we consider that the larger than expected scope of the APS will provide protection for holders of debt and hybrid instruments.
Nevertheless, having raised its potential economic interest in RBS to 95%, we believe that the UK government will not be able to avoid full nationalisation in the case that assistance beyond the current measures is required in the future. The Treasury has not provided guidance on its approach to potential losses for hybrid debt holders in case of 100% government ownership, but ultimately we would expect to see a very high level of loss for holders of non-cumulative preference shares as in the case of the nationalisation of Northern Rock.
Given the potentially higher transition risk and expected loss for these capital instruments, we have downgraded all non-cumulative preference shares to non-investment grade. This rating action includes those that have explicit voting rights in certain circumstances and those that can get voting rights through a substitution for non-cumulative preference shares. The RBSG instruments are notched down from the A1 senior unsecured rating of RBSG, and the National Westminster Bank instrument is notched down from the Aa3 senior unsecured rating of National Westminster Bank, however due to the risks highlighted above, the notching goes beyond what is captured in our current guidelines for hybrid instruments.
RBS plc's C- BFSR remains under review for further possible downgrade, and the review will be completed in the coming weeks following a full review of RBS' participation in the UK government's Asset Protection Scheme, which was announced on 26th February.
The junior subordinated debt (rated at A1 for RBS plc, and A2 for RBSG), and hybrid issuance other than non-cumulative preference shares (A3 for RBSG) also remains on review for further downgrade pending the completion of the review of the BFSR, due to the likely widening of notching should the BFSR go down further.
The last rating action on RBS was on January 20, 2009 when the senior debt ratings were downgraded from Aa1 to Aa3 (negative outlook).
The principal methodologies used in rating this issuer were "Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology" (February 2007), "Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology" (March 2007) as well as "Guidelines for Rating Bank Junior Securities" (April 2007) which can be found at www.moodys.com in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory, in the Ratings Methodologies subdirectory. Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory.
Based in Edinburgh, RBS reported total proforma assets of GBP 2,219 billion as of 31 December 2008.
CREDIT RATINGS ARE MIS'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES. MIS DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL, FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS ARE NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT CONSTITUTE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND CREDIT RATINGS ARE NOT RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INVESTOR. MIS ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE, HOLDING, OR SALE.
Copyright 2009, Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and/or its licensors and affiliates including Moody's Assurance Company, Inc. (together, "MOODY'S"). All rights reserved.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED, DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY'S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT. All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY'S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, such information is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind and MOODY'S, in particular, makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of any such information. Under no circumstances shall MOODY'S have any liability to any person or entity for (a) any loss or damage in whole or in part caused by, resulting from, or relating to, any error (negligent or otherwise) or other circumstance or contingency within or outside the control of MOODY'S or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents in connection with the procurement, collection, compilation, analysis, interpretation, communication, publication or delivery of any such information, or (b) any direct, indirect, special, consequential, compensatory or incidental damages whatsoever (including without limitation, lost profits), even if MOODY'S is advised in advance of the possibility of such damages, resulting from the use of or inability to use, any such information. The credit ratings and financial reporting analysis observations, if any, constituting part of the information contained herein are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY'S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER. Each rating or other opinion must be weighed solely as one factor in any investment decision made by or on behalf of any user of the information contained herein, and each such user must accordingly make its own study and evaluation of each security and of each issuer and guarantor of, and each provider of credit support for, each security that it may consider purchasing, holding or selling. MOODY'S hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MOODY'S have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MOODY'S for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,500 to $2,400,000. Moody's Corporation (MCO) and its wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary, Moody's Investors Service (MIS), also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS's ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually on Moody's website at www.moodys.com under the heading "Shareholder Relations - Corporate Governance - Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy."
Moody's Investors Service Pty Limited does not hold an Australian financial services licence under the Corporations Act. This credit rating opinion has been prepared without taking into account any of your objectives, financial situation or needs. You should, before acting on the opinion, consider the appropriateness of the opinion having regard to your own objectives, financial situation and needs.

Anonimo ha detto...

FORZA INTER !!!!

Roberto

Anonimo ha detto...

Se le banche fanno pulizia, vuol dire che esce fuori qualcosa...e probabilmente qualcuno da qualche altra parte del mondo inizierà ad invocare maggior trasparenza...alla fine? Alla fine si fa pulizia dei prodotti tossici e dei soldi della gente. Mi sembra proprio questo il senso del casino.

Un Neopromotore

Luca

Anonimo ha detto...

Bah se BnpBnl si arrabbia e dice chi vi e´dietro alle 13 scatole occulte che controllano Finivest...
Baron de la Suisse
Edmundus Jagaller de Mosargon
Luxdelait Geneve
edmundojagallerdemosargon@yahoo.co.uk

Anonimo ha detto...

liberi dai partiti. e subito!